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NOTE
THE JURY: A REFLECTION OF THE PREJUDICES
OF THE COMMUNITY
The Heterogeneous Culture
Bias in fthe Culture
The problem of selecting a "fair and impartial" jury recently
received front page publicity in the San Francisco Bay Area during
the trial of Huey P. Newton, a young black militant accused of mur-
dering a white policeman.' Newton and his supporters charged that
it was impossible for him to get a fair trial in the American judicial
system. One objection was that the jury would be composed not of
Newton's "peers" but of middle class whites, with racist attitudes,
who would be predisposed to find him guilty. He explained that by
a "jury of his peers" he meant not an exclusively black jury, but one
consisting of people from and involved in his community, West Oak-
land, a lower class, primarily black, ghetto. People of similar eco-
nomic status and language would be able to empathize with him, he
felt, while middle and upper class whites would not.2 Not one of the
jury finally impaneled could be classified as a member of Newton's
peer group.3 This jury convicted Newton of voluntary manslaughter,
a verdict which was virtually irreconcilable with the testimony.4 It
is felt the conviction was the result of an attitude on the part of the
jurors that Newton should not get off scot-free, even though they had
not been convinced of his guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."
I People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal.,
Sept. 27, 1968). Huey P. Newton is Minister of Defense of the Black Panther
Party, a radical, black militant organization. In addition to murder, CAL. PEN.
CODE § 187, he was also charged with assault with a deadly weapon, CAL. PEN.
CODE § 245 (b) (acquitted), and kidnapping, CAL. PEN. CODE § 207 (dropped).
2 For a report of Newton's opinions as given at a press conference, see
Boyle, Notes on Jury Selection in the Huey P. Newton Trial, THE PRoGaRssSM,
Oct. 1968, at 29, 34.
8 Id. at 34. Miss Boyle reports that the final jury, including alternates,
consisted of one black (a loan officer in a bank), one person of Japanese ances-
try, three with Spanish surnames (one a native of Cuba), a cosmetic sales-
woman, a second banker, a machinist, two housewives, a bologna slicer, an
engineer and property owner, and three employees of, respectively, a food
packaging firm, a paper company, and an airline food caterer. Id.
Argument on a motion to quash the entire master panel and jury venire
and the voir dire consumed the first three weeks of the trial. Id.
4 See, e.g., Good, Verdict on Huey Newton: An Oversupply of Doubt,
NATioN, Sept. 30, 1968, at 300.
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The bias present in a situation like Newton's can be contrasted
with the common bias, most extreme in the South, in favor of a white
man suspected of having committed a crime against a black person.
Not infrequently, no jury will indict, much less convict, him.5 In
either case, the likelihood of justice going awry-the guilty going free
or the innocent being convicted-is magnified because no jury se-
lected by our present methods could possibly be called "impartial."
The racist attitudes prevalent in white America today have been well
documented. 6 It is not surprising that they also pervade the judicial
system, including that "reflection of the conscience of the com-
munity," the jury.7 Where jury deliberations have become known,
overt prejudice toward blacks has been revealed.8
The existence of this bias places the black criminal defendant in a
quandary. The chance of acquittal is generally twice as good before
a jury as before a judge, and where juries do convict, they tend to
convict on a lesser charge and sentence more lightly than a judge
would.9 Yet black people are more likely than whites to be con-
victed, and of a higher degree of crime;' 0 if convicted, they also face
more severe punishment." On the other hand, black jurors, for rea-
sons which should not need explanation, tend to favor the under-
dog.12  This is not solely a racial phenomenon, but also a socio-
economic one; juries of white collar workers (which would include
few blacks) are preferred by prosecutors because they are more will-
ing to convict.' 3
Cultural differences-ignorance of mores, language, life styles-
compound the jury problem where defendants are not from the pre-
dominant socio-economic group, particularly where racial differences
are present. One anthropologist tells of a recent homicide trial in
which the defendant, the victim, and all witnesses except the police
5 L. MILLER, THE PETONERS: THE STORY Or THE SUPREME CoURT Or THE
UN=TED STATEs ANm TE NEGRO 292-93 (1967).
6 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVIsORY CoMMIssIoN ON CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT
(1968); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERIcAN DiLEMMA (2d ed. 1962).
7 Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 So. CAL. L. REv. 235,
245 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn].
8 Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DuxE L.J. 19, 21-24 [hereinafter
cited as Broeder].
9 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMEImcAN JuRY 58-61 (1966).
10 Broeder, supra note 8, at 23.
11 H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERIcAN JuRY 210-11 (1966); G. MYRDAL,
AN AMERIcAN DLEMMA 550-54 (2d ed. 1962).
12 Broeder, supra note 8, at 29.
18 Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 16, at 1078
(1966) (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach); Note, The Congress, the
Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I and 1I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1966, 52 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1095 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Congress,
the Court and Jury Selection].
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were black ghetto residents.1 4 Testimony brought out that before,
the homicide, the person who was killed had "put [the defendant]
in the dozens."' 5 Defense counsel's efforts to elicit clarification of
this phrase were met with prosecution objections, which were sus-
tamed, that the witness was not an expert in semantics. As a result,
neither judge nor jury learned that the death was a consequence of
a "game" of verbal aggression and abusive namecalling, initiated by
the deceased against the defendant.'8 In the same trial, when an-
other witness was asked whether he had ever been convicted of a.
nsdmeanor or a felony, he answered in the negative. When asked
whether he had ever served time in a correctional institution, he re-
plied, "No, sir, but I was a steward in the merchant marine for
twenty years."' 7  But when asked about specific convictions, he
readily admitted them, and'to having been imprisoned. Faced with
questions in a vocabulary that was, unintelligible to him, he had
guessed (incorrectly) at the answers rather than reveal his ignorance
of the words used. The jurors decided that the witnesses were either
morons or liars, and the resulting verdict .was a compromise out of
confusion.is Other indications of cultural differences such as dress,
demeanor, manner of speaking, and attitudes, as well as those of
culture alone, also greatly influence jurors.19
The problem inherent in these differences is 'that while our so-
ciety is culturally heterogeneous, with sharp: differences among vari-
ous groups, our legal system-including the jury system-functions
as though we had a homogeneous -culture--that of the dominant
Anglo-Saxon middle class. The result is built-in prejudice against
the culturally different.20
Representation on Juries
It has been said that the law cannot, as a practical matter, pro-
vide juries entirely free of prejudice, and that accordingly, "the de-
fendant's hope and the law's faith have traditionally been that indi-
vidual biases will somehow cancel each other out if only the system
of selection is fair and the jurors are free from overwhelming ex-
ternal influences. '21 It is the thesis of this note that we are incap-
14 Brief for D. Swett as Amicus Curiae on Defendant's Motion to Quash
the Master Panel, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., 'Alameda County,
Cal., Sept. 27, 1968) (Built-in Biases in the American Legal System).
'5 Id. at 5.
i Id. at 4-5.
17 Id. at 6.
is Id. at 5-6.
29 Id. at 12-13.
20 Id. at 4. Jurors themselves have -occasionally indicated their aware-
ness of this anomaly; where considering a case involving a black defendant,
they have some times expressed a desire to have'a black on the jury, or have
used any black who perchance was a member, as an "expert" on black ghetto
culture. See Broeder, supra note 8,'at 30.
21 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 242.
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able even of approaching this lesser goal of balancing the biases, at
least in cases involving members of racial and cultural minorities
(whether as victims or suspected perpetrators), unless and until our
juries adequately represent those minorities. If the primary justifi-
cation for the use of lay juries is that "they can reflect the conscience
and mores of the community in applying punitive sanctions to indi-
vidual cases, ' 22 it should also be recognized that "the community"
is an amalgam of heterogeneous "sub-communities." As will be
shown, however, under present systems of jury selection, lay juries
tend to represent only one "sub-community," the dominant white
middle class.
If our juries "truly" represented, in rough proportion, the various
racial, socio-economic and cultural groups within the geographic area
from which they were drawn, they would more adequately represent
the conscience of the community, an amalgam of all its parts. Biases
of different groups would have, at most, only the proportional weight
they carried within the community. Thus, although prejudices of
the dominant class would not be cancelled out, they would at least be
rendered less determinative of the verdict and perhaps less inflexible
as well, simply because of the presence of minority group members on
the same jury. Although a complete absence of biases may not be
possible, a proportional representation of all biases is a practical
possibility and would be preferable to the present overemphasis
given the biases of the majority.
This note will discuss current methods of jury selection, em-
phasizing the selection of criminal juries in cases that have racial
and/or socio-economic overtones, with a critical analysis of the steps
commonly involved in such selection. Also given will be a synopsis
of the current position of the law and the direction in which it is
headed, and an analysis of 'the Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968.23 Finally, some partial remedies will be suggested, aimed at
accomplishing more proportional representation on our juries of the
racial, cultural and socio-economic groups which exist in a given
community.
The Selection Process
Since the method of selecting juries in the state courts is a matter
of local law, usually left to the discretion of the local bench to work
out within a very general statutory framework, and since there has
not been until recently a uniform method of jury selection among
the federal courts,24 the systems used vary widely even within a
single state. However, certain general steps are common to all. From
22 Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
23 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1964). The statute
was passed on March 27, 1968 and became effective 270 days later.
24 Until the passage of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. See
note 23 supra.
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some source, a list of prospective jurors is drawn. These people are
screened to weed out those who lack the "qualifications" required by
local law, those who are "exempt," and those who are "excused."
Panels of jurors are selected, generally by lot or some other chance
method, from those who remain on the list. Finally, after voir dire
examination and the exercise of "for cause" and "peremptory" chal-
lenges, jurors are selected out of the panel who will actually sit in
judgment on the particular case.
The Population Pool
It should be apparent immediately that the initial determination
of the pool of prospective jurors, the "population" from which the
jury list will be drawn, is crucial in determining the nature of the
jury that will finally be chosen. Depending upon the definition of
"population," it is possible, and indeed most probable, that large
groups or classes of people will be automatically excluded from jury
service merely because they fail to fall within the definition. To
illustrate, if prospective jurors are to be drawn from lists of regis-
tered voters, that determination eliminates all those not registered
to vote. Obviously, any list of prospective jurors will not be repre-
sentative of anything other than the "population" from which it is
drawn. Thus the more nearly that "population" corresponds to the
composition of the entire community, the more representative of that
community the jury list will be.
"Key Man" System
The determination of the "population" from which prospective
jurors will be drawn is almost universally entirely within the dis-
cretion of the local jury commissioners.25 The method most widely
used is the so-called "key man" system or one of its variations. 26 Un-
der this system, the jury commissioner selects people from the com-
munity ("key men") to recommend others of their acquaintance for
jury duty. Since people generally are acquainted primarily with
others of similar interests, backgrounds, and socio-economic status,
the "key men" will tend to recommend people like themselves. Un-
less they themselves are representative of all parts of the commun-
ity, the prospective jurors they recommend will not be either. Since
the same generality is likely to be true of the commissioner (that is,
the "key men" he selects will tend to come from his own subculture),
there is a great tendency towards uniformity of jurors and a con-
25 The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection, supra note 13, at 1076.
For a review of state statutes, see id. at 1072-76. This is no longer true for
the federal courts, since the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 has be-
come effective. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
26 Lindquist, An Analysis of Juror Selection Procedure in the United
States District Courts, 41 Tm:PLE L.Q. 32, 33 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Lindquist].
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sequent distorted reflection of the community.27
One common variation used either exclusively or primarily in a
number of judicial districts, is the "key organization" system, where
community organizations are requested to supply prospective jurors
from their membership lists. Since over half the nation's adult
population belongs to no voluntary organization, and there are eco-
nomic, racial, educational and occupational correlations to the join-
ing of organizations, this method is subject to the same criticism of
distorted community representation.2 8
The "key man" method and its variations have been the sub-
ject of much criticism by legal writers as being productive of "blue
ribbon" juries,29 but generally have been upheld by the courtssd In
one case, Cassell v. Texas,31 the Supreme Court struck down a jury
panel chosen by this system, but only because the jury commissioner
admitted that no effort whatsoever had been made to find qualified
people in the black community, which in this instance formed a
significant portion of the population.82 The system itself has been
judicially condemned only by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and even there only for the federal courts of that circuit.33
Public List System
After the "key man" system, the second most common method of
selecting potential jurors is by using public lists of one type or an-
other-telephone directories, tax rolls, or voter registration lists.34
The economic discrimination inherent in the first two types of public
lists is obvious. Particularly in rural areas, but even in urban areas,
poor people are less likely to have telephones. Similarly, tax rolls-
especially if real property tax lists (the most common type of mu-
nicipal taxation) are used-will exclude the poorest segment of the
community.
The use of such economically discriminating sources has been
held illegal only if some further element of discrimination which is
27 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 262.
28 Generally, those who are richer, more educated, employed as white
collar workers or professional persons, and the white majority are more likely
to belong to voluntary organizations. See Lindquist, supra note 26, at 35-36.
Of course, the choice of organizations to serve as "sponsors" will also greatly
affect the result.
29 See, e.g., id. at 37-47; Kuhn, supra note 7, at 260-64.
30 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1965); Billingsley v.
Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841- (1966); cf. Chance v.
United States, 322 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 823 (1964);
United States v. Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178, 194-95 (W.D. Tex. 1967); United States
v. Duke, 263 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
31 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
32 Id. at 287-88.
83 Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
34 Lindquist, supra note 26, at 34.
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overtly based on race is involved. For example, in Whitus v. Georgia35
the Supreme Court found that blacks had been systematically ex-
cluded from jury panels. The male population3 6 of the county was
42.6 percent black, but only 27.1 percent of the taxpayers (from whom
jurors were chosen) were black.8 7 In spite of this disparity, the
Court did not condemn the use of the tax lists. It merely held that
the particular jury list involved was invalid because it was based in
part on a previous list that had already been condemned by the
Court, and because the race of the black taxpayer was noted on the
lists.
The use of voter registration lists must be discussed in more de-
tail; first, because the lists would appear to be nondiscriminatory in
the northern and western states, and second, because their use for
jury selection purposes has recently been given sanction by the Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968.38 The use of such lists in the North
has been upheld on the grounds that no "cognizable class," i.e., a
racial, economic, political or other identifiable group, was shown to
have been excluded.3 9 In the South, however, it has been recognized
that voting lists which are themselves a product of discrimination
may not be used.40
In 1964, of a voting age population throughout the nation of 114
million, only about 80 million were registered to vote.41 Residence
requirements are the most severe legal restriction upon registration,
resulting in an estimated 8 million disenfranchised in" 1960.42 A large
35 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
30 According to state law, women were qualified but not compelled to
serve on juries; they were excused upon request. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545, 550 n.1 (1957), citing GA. CODE Aim. § 59-124 (1965).
37 Out of 33 prospective grand jurors, three were black; one actually served
on a grand jury of 19. Of 90 prospective trial jurors, seven were black; none
actually served. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967).
38 See text accompanying notes 158, 163-64 infra.
39 Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963); United States v.
Greenberg, 200 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. United States v. Bowe, 360
F.2d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1966) (validity conceded by appellants).
40 United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 78 (5th Cir. 1959);
White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 404-05 (N.D. Ala. 1966); Harper v. State, 251
Miss. 699, 171 So. 2d 129 (1965).
41 Lindquist, supra note 26, at 47. According to the Gallup Poll, in the 1968
presidential election there were approximately 120 million people of voting age,
of whom 72 million (60 percent) voted. By way of comparison, in 1964, 62
percent voted and in 1960, 63 percent voted. Projecting from polls, of the 48
million who did not vote in 1968, 4 million were ineligible because they were
aliens or inmates of prisons and mental hospitals; 15 million were registered
but were disinterested or did not like the candidates; 10 million could have
registered but did not; 7 million were sick or disabled; 5 million were pre-
vented from voting by residence requirements; 3 million were away from
home; 3 million said they could not leave their jobs; 1 million failed to obtain
absentee ballots. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 12, 1968, § T, at 9, cols. 1-2.
42 Lindquist, supra note 26, at 48. In 1968, about 5 million persons were
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proportion of these disenfranchised are from lower class cultural
minorities, such as migrant farm workers or southern blacks who
have recently immigrated to northern cities.43 Extra-legal re-
strictions such as intimidation or apathy (which are also related to
racial and/or socio-economic status) are largely responsible for the
remaining failures to register.44 "[I]n view of the fact that the
lists exclude over 30 million people, a disproportionate number of
whom are members of the lowest socio-economic strata of society,"45 it
is doubtful that voter registration lists, without supplementation, are
capable of producing representative juries.46
The lower proportional voter registration among-black people is
not a peculiarly southern phenomenon. In the recent trial of Huey
Newton, there was expert testimony 'to the effect that all recent
studies of voting and voter registration, in the North as well as in
the South, have shown that "poor persons and black persons and
especially poor black persons are much less likely to register to vote
S.. than are white persons or wealthy persons and especially white
wealthy persons."47 Evidence introduced in the trial concerning ur-
ban Alameda County, California, showed that while the county-wide
registration rate of eligible voters was 82 percent, the registration
rate in West Oakland, the predominately lower class black community
in which the defendant was raised and lived, was 52.5 percent.48 In
disenfranchised by this method. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 12, 1968 § T,
at 9, cols. 1-2 (Gallup Poll). Residence of one year is required by 34 states
and two years is required by Mississippi. Lindquist, supra note 26, at 48.
43 Cf. BUREAu OF THE CENsUS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION Or
NOVEMBER 1966, at 3 (Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 174, 1968).
44 See Lindquist, supra note 26, at 48.. In the South only 28-39 percent of
the eligible population is registered. Id.
45 Id. at 49.
46 Id.
47 Record, vol. 1, at 260, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda
County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968) (testimony of sociologist Sheldon Messenger).
48 Exhibit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Quash the Master Panel,
People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968).
The following is a replica of the exhibit:
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT VOTING REGISTRATION
IN ALAMEDA COUNTY
1 -2 3 4
Selected Areas Percentage of Number of Number of Rate of
of Alameda Population Persons 21 Registered Registration
County Negro or Older Voters (Col. 3/CoL 2)
Total: Alameda
County 12.4 569,183 466,905 82.0
West Oaklanda 71.3 20,680 10,862 52.5
South Oaklandb 80.0 4,581 3,443 75.2
Montclaira 0.05 11,575 9,698 83.6
Haywardb 0.1 38,723 32,293 83.4
San Leandrob 0.02 39,957 32,995 82.6
Total Alameda
County Negro (approx.) 60.0
Population
a. Figures for these areas are taken from Exhibit Y in People v. Craig, No.
1424 [Vol. 20
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contrast, suburban Montclair, with a black population of .05 percent,
had the highest registration rate in the county with 83.6 percent.49
A sociologist testified in the Newton trial that the primary reason
for the difference in registration rates was that
low income people in general, and more specifically, the Negro popu-
lation is more apathetic vis-a-vis the political process. It is a case of
having less to gain from the political process.... [T]he political
system ... has been historically and remains contemporarily, al-
though perhaps in a reduced amount, a relatively closed and foreign
apparatus vis-a-vis the Negro population.SO
He estimated that the overall registration rate of black adults was
60 percent.51 Under circumstances like these, it is difficult to under-
stand how one California court, while acknowledging that in its par-
ticular area the registration rate of blacks was 23 percent less than
that of other racial groups, could state that the use of voter registra-
tion lists was not "inherently" discriminatory because qualifications
and desire to register are factors "neutral to .. .national, racial or
economic origin.152 According to the court, the fact that blacks tend
proportionally to register less than others was "irrelevant" to the de-
fendant's right53 to have a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community.5 4
Notice
Regardless of the source from which the names of prospective
jurors are drawn, the next step in the selection process is to send out
notices to a given number,5 5 asking them to complete forms estab-
lishing their "qualifications" and availability for jury service. Fail-
ure to follow up on the people who do not respond to the initial mail-
ing is another cause of the disproportionate exclusion of the black
and the poor. In the Huey Newton trial there was testimony that
41750 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., April 18, 1968).
b. Figures for these areas are derived from the collowing sources: Col-
umns 1 and 2 are taken from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS Or HOUsiNG
AND PoPuLATioN: 1960 FniAL REPORT PUC (1)-137 (1966) (census track for San
Francisco-Oakland). Column 3 is from the Registrar of Voters as of April 25,
1968.
49 Exhibit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Quash the Master Panel,
People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968).
50 Record, vol. 1, at 88, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda
County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968) (Assistant Professor Dizard, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley).
51 Id. at 89.
52 People v. Tripp, No. CR 14790, at 2-3 (Super. Ct., San Diego County,
Cal., Nov. 1, 1968).
53 For an analysis of this right see Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300
(1947) (dissenting opinion); People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954).
54 People v. Tripp, No. CR 14790, at 3 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, Cal.,
Nov. 1, 1968).
55 Selected haphazardly, although perhaps weighted to balance the sexes.
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the poor, and particularly the black poor, are more likely to move to
an unknown address, to move out of the county, or to fail to respond
for some other reasons than are whites or the relatively wealthy.56
This was borne out by the evidence, which showed that of those to
whom a notice of jury duty was sent, almost twice as many people
from the ghetto community as compared to the white suburban com-
munity were eliminated because they failed to respond. 7
The "Unqualified"
The third step in the selection process is the elimination of "un-
qualified" persons. 58 The required "qualifications" may be either ob-
jective (for example, being at least 21 and meeting residency re-
quirements) ,59 or subjective (for example, possessing "ordinary in-
telligence" 60 or being of "good character"). Either kind might be
unduly discriminatory; the former by automatically excluding signifi-
cant population segments, and the latter by giving the jury commis-
sioner broad discretion, thereby permitting the exercise of any biases
he may have.
The socio-economic discrimination inherent in objective residency
requirements has already been noted in connection with the use of
voter registration lists.61 Another common type of objective dis-
qualification is one against people with prior felony convictions,62
although as Lawrence Speiser of the American Civil Liberties Union
has pointed out, many times the people on trial are "the failures,
the repeated failures, and . . . it would be desirable to have indi-
viduals [on the jury who, also being 'failures,'] perhaps would have
a better understanding of the pressures, the problems ... [of ghetto]
situations .. ."68A third common criterion is one of minimum economic status.
In New York, for example, a prospective juror must own at least two
hundred and fifty dollars of personal property. 4 The discrimination
here is apparent.
56 Record, vol. 1, at 256-57, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Ala-
meda County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968).
57 Id. at 257.
58 Drawing up a list of prospective jurors and eliminating the "unquali-
fied" may be combined in one step, as where the key man system is such that
those who make the recommendations select only "qualified" people.
59 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 198.
60 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 198.
61 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
62 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 199 (2).
63 Hearings on S. 3296, Amendment 561 to S. 3296, S. 1497, S. 1654, S.
2845, S. 2846, S. 2923 and S. 3170 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1132-33 (1966).
64 N.Y. JUDICiARY LAW § 504(3) (McKinney 1964); see Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261 (1947) (similar statute upheld). Economic status is frequently a
nonstatutory qualification, as where tax rolls are used as the source of pros-
pective jurors. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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The use of subjective qualifications was considered by the Su-
preme Court in Fay v. New York.6 5 In that case the so-called "blue
ribbon" jury was upheld because the application of subjective stand-
ards-being intelligent, well-informed and literate in English--did
not, according to the Court, result in the intentional exclusion of a
recognizable class.66 The application of subjective standards like
"intelligence," "judgment," and "character" invariably will be dis-
criminatory to the degree that the jury commissioner's or the "key
man's" conception of those qualities is determined by his own edu-
cational, moral and socio-economic status. Moreover, the belief is
widespread that the above listed qualities are rare among black peo-
ple, not only because of less favorable educational and environmental
influences, but also because of inherent shortcomings.6 7  Addition-
ally, subjective qualifications are sometimes given a veneer of non-
discriminatory application, as in the use of "objective" tests to meas-
ure "ordinary intelligence." Such a test was the reason for a recent
dismissal of a jury panel in Alameda County because the test in
question measured middle-class mores and vocabulary rather than
intelligence.68 The failure rate on the test was 14.5 percent in a
white suburban community and 81.5 percent in a predominately
black, lower class community.69 The court refused to believe that
"81.5% of the registered voters in a large section of Oakland are be-
low the level of 'ordinary intelligence.' "70
The "Exempt" and the "Excused"
Some people are exempt from liability for jury duty by statute,
usually because of their occupation.71 Others are excused, generally
05 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
06 Id. at 290-92.
67 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 268.
68 People v. Craig, No. 41750 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., April 18,
1968). The court also considered the question whether the limitation of thejury panel to registered voters was itself too narrow, but decided that the per-
centage of adults otherwise qualified for jury service who failed to register in
Alameda County "is probably small ... since intensive voter registration
drives take place before each state and national election and no group is dis-
couraged from registering or voting." Id. at 8. However, no evidence on the
issue was before the court. Defendant's Motion to Quash the Master Panel
8, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., Sept. 27,
1968).
69 People v. Craig, No. 41750, at 5 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal.,
April 18, 1968).
70 Id. at 7 (emphasis in the original).
71 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 200, which exempts, among others:
Holders of public office; members of the Armed Forces while on active duty;
teachers, physicians and dentists; telegraph and telephone company employees;
attorneys, their clerks and secretaries; ministers; and persons who have re-
cently performed jury duty. An exemption must be claimed by the person
entitled to it. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 202.
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on the basis of economic or physical hardship.72 Usually the jury
commissioner has the discretionary power to grant excuses, al-
though he may be subject to judically determined procedures or
rules.73 Since the usual excuse is for financial hardship, the exercise
of the commissioner's discretion commonly results in the exclusion of
a disproportionate number of poor people, and therefore of blacks
and other racial minorities.74 The practice of systematically excusing
aUl daily wage earners has been prohibited in the federal courts, 75 and
the prohibition was recently extended by the Fifth Circuit to the state
courts.76 However, such decisions have curtailed the discriminatory
effects of the discretion to grant excuses only in one flagrant form.
The courts-while regretting that stipends for jury service are in-
sufficient-have generally exercised little control over standards used
to determine hardship, and have accepted unquestioningly the result-
ant economic and therefore, generally racial, discrimination. 77
The Voir Dire
From the resulting list of qualified jurors (those from the original
notified "population" not disqualified, exempt, or excused), some
72 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 201.
73 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 201 (a). Judicial standards established
in Alameda County permit hardship excuses for: Wage earners who are not
paid while on jury duty and who have more than two children and a spouse
who does not work; unemployed women with small children and no child care;
and the operators of small businesses. Record, vol. 1, at 25-27, People v. New-
ton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968). The court
itself, rather than the commissioner, will grant excuses under other circum-
stances.
74 In People v. Tripp, No. CR 14790 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, Cal.,
Nov. 1, 1968), the court granted defendant's motion to quash the petit jury
panel. The court found that the commissioner departed from the statutory
scheme in granting hardship excuses "for slight or trivial causes." Id. at 5,
citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 201. This resulted in the use of standards that
were "objectionably vague and subconscious," which effectively eliminated
several large classes in the community, principally the unemployed, the impov-
erished, and the blue collar worker. People v. Tripp, supra at 5. The court
also found that a prima facie case of discrimination had been established by
showing that blacks comprised five per cent of the registered voters but less
than one per cent of the jury panel; the presumption of discrimination was not
overcome by the evidence, which showed that the disparity was related to
the departure from the statutory standards governing economic hardship of
jurors. Id. at 6.
75 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). The Supreme Court
based its decision on its supervisory power, but said that the exclusion "cannot
be justified by federal or state law." Id. at 222.
76 Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991
(1967). See further discussion of case in text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 474-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). But see People v. Tripp, No. CR 14790 (Super. Ct., San Diego County,
Cal., Nov. 1, 1968).
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number is summoned for service on a particular panel. Prospective
jurors are then subjected to a voir dire examination, which is in-
tended to eliminate from the jury any who have preconceptions which
will affect or prevent an unbiased judgment of the particular facts of
the case. During the voir dire a prospective juror may be challenged
by the court or by counsel, and thereby excused.7 8 Challenges for
cause may be made on the grounds either of implied bias-where an
inference of bias is drawn from the existence of a relationship or
other connection between the juror and an element of the case such
as a party-or of actual bias-where the juror admits to a state of
mind which would prevent him from being impartial.7 9 The fact that
the prospective juror admits to prejudice or bias is not necessarily
sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause: If he asserts convincingly
that he can overcome his feelings and judge the case with an open
mind, the challenge is not allowed.80
The use of challenges for cause is hopelessly incapable of pro-
tecting the culturally or racially different criminal defendant from
the racial prejudices of the jurors, the bulk of whom are drawn from
the dominant white middle class. At the heart of the problem is the
virtual impossibility of getting people to state their biases in the
public voir dire. Most are reluctant to admit prejudice in the pres-
ence of strangers;81 others are not consciously aware of their racist
attitudes, or underestimate the impact of them on their ability to be
objective.8 2 The fact that in our society most if not all white people
either consciously or unconsciously have attitudes of superiority to-
ward other racial groups8 3 has led one authority to state that the only
way to eliminate white racism from a criminal case involving racial
issues would be to have a jury of only black people, "a jury that
would [in] the sociological sense . . . be a jury of the peers of the
defendant. '8 4
Peremptory challenges8 5 are equally incapable of eliminating jur-
ors with racist attitudes. While challenges for cause, used to excuse
the rare juror who confesses to unalterable prejudice, are unlimited
in number, the number of peremptory challenges which might be
78 Schuck, Selection of a Jury, in CALIFoRNiA CivnL PROCEDURE DURING
TRIAL 93, 113 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1960).
70 Title, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Criminal Cases, 43 CAL. ST.
B.J. 70, 71-74 (1968).
80 Id. at 81.
81 Record, vol. 1, at 223, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda
County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968).
82 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 243-44.
83 Record, vol. 1, at 283, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda
County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968). See generally NATiONAL ADvisony CoMMissioN
oN Criv DisoRDERs REPORT (1968).
84 Record, vol. 1, at 285, People v. Newton, No. 41266 (Super. Ct., Alameda
County, Cal., Sept. 27, 1968).
85 Some system of peremptory challenges is common to almost all juris-
dictions.
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used to eliminate those only suspected of racism is limited.8 6 And
because of the pervasiveness of racial prejudice, the excused juror is
more than likely to be replaced by another with similar racial atti-
tudes. However, where only a few minority members are on the jury
panel, the peremptory challenge is an effective tool for eliminating
them. It thus becomes an efficient device for the preservation of all-
white juries.87
The use of peremptory challenges in this way by the prosecution
has been the subject of many appeals,88 only one of which has
reached the United States Supreme Court. In Swain v. Alabama,89
defense counsel showed that in the jurisdictional district no black
person had survived the exercise of peremptory challenges over a
fifteen year period, although blacks comprised 26 percent of the popu-
lation and 10 to 15 percent of the jury panels. In a six to three de-
cision, the Court held that the petitioner had failed to sustain the
burden of proving that blacks were systematically excluded through
the use of the challenges. Although a prima facie showing of dis-
crimination would have been made had the discrepancy between
blacks in the population and on the jury panels been sufficient,90 such
a prima facie rule of exclusion was not applicable to the peremptory
86 Where racial prejudice is "acceptable" to the community, defense coun-
sel may do his client more harm than good by challenging an overtly biased
venireman, even though he might be replaced by one less biased. Kuhn, supra
note 7, at 244.
87 The manner in which blacks are totally eliminated from final juries
because they constitute such a small percentage of the panels, even though the
community has a large black population, has been demonstrated in many cases.
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Watkins v. State, 199 Ga. 81, 33
S.E.2d 325 (1945); State v. Barksdale, 247 La. 198, 170 So. 2d 374 (1964), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 921 (1965).
88 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Watkins v. State, 199
Ga. 81, 33 S.E.2d 325 (1945); State v. Barksdale, 247 La. 198, 170 So. 2d 374
(1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 921 (1965).
89 380 U.S. 202 (1965). For criticism of the case, see L. MILLER, Ta
PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT Or THE UNITED STATES AND THE
NEGRO 291-92 (1967); Kuhn, supra note 7, at 283-87; Note, Peremptory Chal-
lenge--Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39
Miss. L.J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blue-
print for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Swain v. Alabama]; 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
90 The Court found that blacks were underrepresented by ten percent, an
insufficient disparity for a prima facie case. 380 U.S. at 208-09. The decep-
tiveness of the Court's finding is apparent: the ten percent figure was appar-
ently arrived at by subtracting ten to fifteen percent from twenty-six percent;
but black representation on jury panels was in fact about fifty percent less
:than their proportion in the population (10-15 percent on panel/26 percent of
population - Y2 = 50 percent). See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical
Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 338, 346 &
n.34 (1966); Kuhn, supra note 7, at 252. Criticism of the Supreme Court's
mathematics is implied in Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 56 n.55
(5th Cir. 1966).
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challenge procedure. 91 Rather, in order to satisfy the state action
requirement of the equal protection clause, the defense would be
required to show "when, why and under what circumstances"9 2 the
prosecution had removed blacks in the past.93 A complementary
ruling was that with respect to peremptory challenge cases, as with
discriminatory selection of jury panels, equal protection would not
apply to a particular case but only to a course of conduct over a period
of time.94 In short, Swain says that peremptory challenges are not
subject to judicial scrutiny, and their use against those suspected of
sympathy with an adverse party is common, legitimate, and beyond
the reach of the equal protection clause in any given case.95
The impact of Swain is to isolate effectively from judicial review
a device susceptible of extraordinarily efficient use, to perpetuate a
totally white jury system in the South, and to prevent racially bal-
anced juries in the North in cases in which race is an issue.96 The basic
supposition of the Court seems to be that the removal from jury
panels of blacks who might possibly be sympathetic to a black de-
fendant will result in their being replaced by jurors more probably
impartial, albeit white.97 The fallacy here is that, as previously noted,
an all white jury is not neutral towards a, black defendant, but hostile
-particularly if the victim of the alleged crime is white.98
The Court's naivet6 about racial attitudes also reveals itself in
the requirement that the prosecution alone be shown to have been
responsible for the systematic exclusion of blacks through the exer-
cise of peremptory challehges. This burden is not only virtually
insuperable, but also unjustifiable,9 9 The requirement ignores the
pervasiveness of racism throughout the legal system, for which state
action is responsible since the.state establishes and operates the legal
system.0 0
A further result of Swain is that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges is given greater protection than the constitutional prohibition
of discrimination.' 0 ' Yet there is no constitutional right to per-
emptory challenges. 0 2 Where a constitutional claim conflicts with a
nonconstitutional claim, the latter must yield. 0 3  Additionally, the
91 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
92 Id. at 226.
98 Id.
94 Id. at 221-22.
95 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 285.
96 See Comment, Swain v. Alabama, supra note 89, at 1174-75.
97 See Kuhn, supra note 7, at 286-87.
98 See text accompanying notes 1-20 supra.
99 See Comment, Swain v. Alabama, supra note 89, at 1161-63.
100 See Kuhn, supra note 7, at 296. ,
101 Accord, Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 853 (1948).
102 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
108 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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peremptory challenge appears to have developed as a protection for
the defendant, 04 and therefore should not be available to assist the
prosecution at the expense of other rights of the defendant.
The basis of the peremptory challenge is not that the challenge
is without reason, but that the reason need not be made known. 05
This rationale could be preserved for most cases, yet yield to con-
stitutional protection from discrimination, if the use of the challenge
could be questioned when it gave rise to a reasonable inference of
discrimination.'0 6 If challenges were consistently exercised against
racial minorities in a case with no racial implications, their use pre-
sumably would not meet the test that racial classification must be
shown to be "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective."'' 07 It would therefore be a denial of equal protection
per se. If, on the other hand, race was relevant to the case being
tried, consistent challenges of minority members would be subject
to review, though not impermissible per se.
Challenges on strictly racial grounds would have to be distin-
guished from those for other, permissible reasons. A black jury
member could still be challenged, for example, because he had the
same kind of job as the defendant. However, a challenge solely on
racial grounds would have the effect of replacing a possibly friendly
juror with a probably hostile one. "It cannot be consistent with
equal protection and with the principles of fair jury selection to per-
mit the state to eliminate one element in the population deemed
friendly to the defense in favor of another presumably hostile in
precisely those cases where this disadvantages members of the mi-
nority race."'0 8
This approach would require a change of the present rule, which
does not allow the defendant to question the composition of his own
particular jury, apart from past juries. But it is clear that even the
prima facie rule of exclusion, if it were applied to the use of per-
emptory challenges, would be inadequate protection. The prose-
cution could easily avoid the rebuttable presumption of discrimina-
tion shown by the absence of black jurors over a period of time by
keeping a few "safe" "Uncle Toms"' 0 9 on the juries or by allowing
blacks to sit unchallenged where race was irrelevant. The only ef-
fective safeguard against such "tokenism" is to allow the defendant
104 See Comment, Swain v. Alabama, supra note 89, at 1170-73. But cf.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965).
105 Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective
Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157, 160 (1967).
106 See Kuhn, supra note 7, at 294; cf. Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d
161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948).
107 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
108 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 291.
109 So-called by the Attorney General of Alabama, speaking of the
blacks who helped acquit Eugene Thomas of the murder of Viola Liuzzo (a
white civil rights worker killed in the South). Id. at 271.
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to challenge the use of peremptories in his own case. 1 0
The voir dire, with its peremptory and for cause challenges, is
the last step in selecting the jury that will be impanelled to decide
a particular case. As has been seen, the usual process begins with
the definition of the population from which all prospective jurors
will come. A group selected from that "population" is notified of
possible jury service, and those who respond are screened to eliminate
the "unqualified." Qualified jurors may claim an exemption or be
excused either before or after being drawn to sit on the panel. This
panel then will be subjected to the voir dire. Each step of the process
is fraught with possibilities for discriminating, intentionally and un-
intentionally, against the less educated, the less fortunate, the less
wealthy portions of the population-with their disproportionate num-
bers of racial minorities. The result is that few, if any, of our juries
even approach being representative of the communities from which
they are drawn."'
The Law-Its Status and Trends
The Case Law
Now that the common methods of jury selection have been
analyzed, the current status of the law and its discernible trends
can be further explored. Since juries in state courts are a matter of
state law and a study of each state is beyond the scope of this note,
discussion of legal controls on these juries will be confined to federal
limitations on the exercise of the state's power. Juries in the federal
system are subject to the supervisory powers of the federal appel-
late courts, as well as to constitutional and congressional control.
Following a discussion of case law, the most recent congressional pro-
nouncement, the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, will be
analyzed.
The "Systematic Exclusion" Rule
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated a constitu-
tional right to jury selection free from racial discrimination in 1879,
when it held that the jury provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
were constitutional under the 13th and 14th amendments." 2 From
110 See id. at 303; Comment, Swain v. Alabama, supra note 89, at
1173-74.
M11 The reader is probably well aware that certain types of discrim-
inatory jury selection are being ignored in this note, such as the discrimina-
tion which eliminates a disproportionate number of young people. They are
outside the scope of this paper; there is no intent to slight their existence or
importance.
112 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879). The Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided, and still provides,
that no otherwise qualified citizen "shall be disqualified for service as grand
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this beginning developed the rule that the "systematic exclusion" of
racial minorities from state jury panels was a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws.113  As a corollary, the Supreme Court developed
the so-called "prima facie" rule: Where there is a significant disparity
between the proportion of a racial group chosen for jury duty and
the proportion of that group in the eligible population, the state has
the burden of rebutting the presumption that racial discrimination is
the cause.114 As has been noted, the Court declined to extend the
prima facie rule to the use of peremptory challenges." 5  The effect
is that so long as the proportion of blacks (or other racial groups) on
the panel is not too far out of line with their numbers on the lists
from which jurors are to be chosen," 6 it makes no difference that
none have in fact served on juries.
The theory underlying the systematic exclusion rule has been
that when a traditionally oppressed group is arbitrarily excluded
from serving on juries, the probability of prejudice to a defendant
belonging to that group is so great as to make a showing of actual
prejudice unnecessary."x7 The rule therefore clearly applies where
the defendant and the excluded jurors all belong to a class tra-
ditionally subject to prejudice and oppression."3 This has led some
courts to adopt the so-called "same class" rule, requiring a showing
of actual prejudice where the defendant does not belong to an op-
pressed class himself, or where the excluded class is different from
his own." 9  Other courts have rejected the rule. 20  The Supreme
or petit juror" in any state or federal court because of "race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude." 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1964).
"3 E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935).
"14 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935); cf. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
What constitutes a "significant" disparity has not been made clear, al-
though in most cases where the Supreme Court has found such a disparity the
exclusion of the racial group has been virtually total. See Kuhn, supra
note 7, at 252-54. So far, the Supreme Court has not held unconstitutional
any given method of defining the "eligible population," so long as it does not
expressly exclude members of a particular racial group. See text accompany-
ing notes 25-54 supra.
"5 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
116 See note 114 supra.
"17 Note, Jury Challenges, Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennett:
A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, 300-01.
118 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954).
119 The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection, supra note 13, at
1097-98.
120 E.g., Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964) (white
civil rights worker allowed to challenge exclusion of blacks); State v. Lowry,
263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965) (white civil rights worker); cf. State v.
Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965) (defendant who believed in God
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Court has never applied it,121 but neither has the Court applied the
systematic exclusion rule in favor of a person who did not belong to
the excluded class. 122
The "Cross Section" Rule
The systematic exclusion rule and its corollaries, based on the
equal protection clause, until recently have been the major limi-
tations imposed on state jury selection methods by federal law.1 28
In the federal court system, however, the rule has prevailed that a
jury must be drawn from a group which represents a "cross section"
of the community:
[T]here is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group
which represents a cross-section of the community. And a cross-
section of the community includes persons with varying degrees of
training and intelligence and with varying economic and social posi-
tions. Under our Constitution, the jury is not to be made the rep-
resentative of the most intelligent, the most wealthy or the most
successful, nor of the least intelligent, the least wealthy, or the least
successful. It is a democratic institution, representative of all qual-
ified classes of people.124
The "cross section" rule was first applied by the Supreme Court
allowed to challenge exclusion of jurors who refused to state a belief in
God).
121 In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947), the Court discussed
the rule without apparent disapproval.
122 For criticism of the same-class rule, see Note, Jury Challenges,
Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 Du.u
L.J. 283, 300-01; Comment, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion
in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection,
74 Y L.J. 919, 920-23 (1965).
The question has been asked in reverse: May there be systematic inclu-
sion of minority groups? The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue,
having avoided it in both Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945), and Cassel v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). The fifth circuit held that systematic inclusion
was constitutional in Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 975 (1967), overruling Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1963),
aff'd on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
The court said in Brooks that the constitutional requirement that a jury
represent a cross section of the community compelled the consideration of
race, although this could not be permitted as a means of discrimination or to
secure proportional representation or a predetermined or fixed limitation.
366 F.2d at 24.
Brooks is actually a due process case, which belongs with the discussion
which follows. See text accompanying notes 146-49 infra. Whether the limi-
tations it puts on the consideration of race are necessary, desirable, or even
capable of being applied, should be considered.
123 The due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment forbade only
trial by a jury that was not impartial. Note, Jury Challenges, Capital Pun-
ishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 Duxn L.J. 283, 299-300,
eiting Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
-24 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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in Glasser v. United States,'125 and further developed in Thiel v. South-
ern Pacific Company,126 a 1946 case which held that the systematic
exclusion of all daily wage earners from federal juries was unlawful.
By imposing this rule on federal courts alone, the Supreme Court has
treated racial and socio-economic discrimination as separate phenom-
ena, requiring that federal courts be free of both while the state
courts need rid themselves of only the most overt kind of racial dis-
crimination. Thus, while the requirement that juries represent a
cross section of the community has been ostensibly applied to racial
exclusion in state courts,'1 27 the Supreme Court declined to apply it
in a socio-economic context to a state "blue ribbon" jury in Fay v.
New York.12 8  The Court in actuality has applied only the system-
atic exclusion rule, a basically different concept, to the states, and
even then only in a racial context.12 9 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, however, in a series of 1966 en banc decisions, 130 applied
the "cross section" rule to juries in both the state and federal systems,
and to both racial and socio-economic exclusion.
As the above quoted language suggests, the "cross section" rule
is basically a due process doctrine, as opposed to the systematic exclu-
sion rule, which is based upon equal protection. Thus in Thiel131
(a cross section case), although the Supreme Court did not consider
125 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In that case, the Court held unlawful the
practice of selecting jurors from lists supplied by public service organizations
which conducted a jury service training program.
126 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (supervisory power).
127 E.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
128 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
129 Some states have adopted the cross section doctrine on their own,
although it is not clear to what extent. See, e.g., People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d
740, 754, 278 P.2d 9, 18 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); State v.
Ferraro, 146 Conn. 59, 147 A.2d 478 (1958), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 880 (1962);,
Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964); State v. Lowry, 263
N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965).
In the California case, the conviction was not reversed because there was
no showing of prejudice to the defendant as required by the state constitution.
People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954) (CAL. CoxsT. art. 6, § 4%).
But see People v. Craig, No. 41750 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal., April
18, 1968); People v. Tripp, No. CR 14790 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, Cal.,
Nov. 1, 1968) (no showing of actual prejudice required).
Exclusion of both racial and economic classes has become an issue in a
current California trial which promises to become notorious, the trial of
Sirhan B. Sirhan for the murder of Senator Robert Kennedy. Defense counsel
argued a motion to quash the indictment, on the grounds that racial and
economic classes were systematically excluded from the grand jury that
brought it in. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 30, 1969, at 6, cols. 6-7; San
Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1969, at 11, cols. 1-2.
130 Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966); Brooks v.
Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967); Labat v.
Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967).
181 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
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wage earners to be a class traditionally subject to discrimination
and oppression, it held that a showing of actual prejudice was not
required as it would have been under equal protection. 132 Also in
Thiel, the petitioner's claim was recognized though he himself was
not a member of the excluded class.' 33
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was even more ex-
plicit in Labat v. Bennett, 34 a habeas corpus proceeding. The court
held that where the records revealed a systematic exclusion of daily
wage earners, the black defendants in a state prosecution were de-
prived of an impartial jury in violation of both due process and
equal protection because the jury did not represent a cross section of
the community. The court declined to base its holding solely on
racial discrimination, although it noted that the excluded group, in
violation of the equal protection clause, encompassed a large portion
of the black community. 13 5 The court said:
This exclusion [of daily wage earners] also goes to the fairness of
the trial. The "very integrity of the fact-finding process" depends
on impartial venires representative of the community as a whole.
The undermining of the jury system's fact-finding process, the op-
portunity for unfairness, the risk that defendants who may be daily
wage earners will be prejudiced by exclusion of jurors in the same
class are dangers which would compel condemnation of the practice
without the necessity of the court's finding actual prejudice affecting
the outcome of the case. In this situation, as in the straight-out
exclusion of Negroes, "the degree of prejudice can never be known."1386
As noted above, the Supreme Court had declined to apply the "cross
section" rule to state jury systems in Fay v. New York. 37 Al-
though purporting to distinguish Fay on factual grounds, the Labat
court in fact rejected both its restrictive approach and its require-
ment of a showing of actual prejudice. The court also removed, at
least impliedly, any necessity for the excluded class to be tradition-
ally oppressed. Furthermore, the court cited with approval state
court decisions in which defendants had successfully challenged the
exclusion of classes to which they themselves did not belong,138 indi-
cating that the fifth circuit will allow any defendant to challenge a
jury selection process which excludes representation from significant
community groups. The effect of Labat is to elevate claims for
equitable jury selection procedures from restrictive equal protection
considerations to due process rights.1 39
132 Id. at 225.
133 For the relationship of the "same class" rule to the equal protection
clause, see text accompanying notes 117-22 supra.
'34 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967).
185 Id. at 720.
130 Id. at 723.
137 332 U.S. 261 (1947). See text accompanying note 128 supra.
138 365 F.2d at 723, citing Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711
(1964); State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). See note 120 supra.
139 See Note, Jury Challenges, Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Ben-
nett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, 302.
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The results are strikingly different when jury selection proce-
dures are treated as a matter of due process rather than equal pro-
tection.140 The due pocess claim includes the equal protection claim,
but goes much farther. 41 . If having a jury which represents a cross
section of the community goes to the fundamental fairness of the
trial, the state has an affirmative duty under the due process clause to
provide such a jury.142 The equal protection claim, however, is de-
nied if state action cannot be shown.143 Because of the requirement
that prejudice be shown except where the defendant belongs to a
traditionally oppressed class, the equal protection claim is highly
individualized, with limited value as precedent if upheld. A pro-
cedural due process claim which is accepted, however, is equivalent
to a determination that the possibility of prejudice to any defendant
receiving the same treatment is too great to be tolerated. Of course,
the "same class" rule has no place in the "cross section" doctrine as
based on the due process clause, because every defendant has the
right to a representative jury. 44
It is true that the courts have not yet defined "representative of a
cross section of the community" to mean proportional representation;
indeed, the cases have said that the defendant is not entitled to pro-
portional representation. 145 However, it is submitted that the refusal
to require proportional representation is neither necessary nor de-
sirable. First, Supreme Court cases which have indicated that there
is no right to proportional representation have considered the equal
protection clause determinative, and can therefore be distinguished
from attempts to define procedural due process rights. Second, as
was recognized by the fifth circuit in Brooks v. Beto,146 the cross
section requirement compels consideration of race. Holding that the
deliberate inclusion of some blacks on jury panels was not unlaw-
ful, the court noted that the Constitution must be color conscious, as
well as color blind, to prevent discrimination from being perpet-
140 See generally Kuhn, supra note 7; Note, Jury Challenges, Capital
Punishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, 301-
02; Comment, The Defendant's Challenge to a Raical Criterion in Jury Selec-
tion: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919,
938-39 (1965).
141 Comment, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in ury
Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74
YALE L.J. 919, 938-39 (1965).
142 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1955).
143 E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
144 See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Rabinowitz
v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966) (white civil rights worker suc-
cessfully challenged exclusion of blacks).
145 E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Billingsly v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13, 18 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1966).
146 366 F.2d 1 (5th Mr. 1966),. cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967).
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uated.147 Unfortunately, the Brooks court emphatically reiterates
the proposition that representation may not deliberately be made
proportional.148 This seems inconsistent with the basic concept of
the jury as "a democratic institution, representative of all qualified
classes of people"'149 and in opposition to the plain meaning of the
words, "representative of a cross-section of the community."' 50
The imposition on the states of an affirmative duty to provide
proportional representation on jury lists as a requirement of due
process would have a great impact on another inadequacy of our
system of criminal justice-one of which both lawyers and laymen
are aware but which has been given little attention by legal
writers' 51 or the courts. This is the propensity of totally or pri-
marily white juries, particularly but not exclusively in the South,
to acquit or refuse to indict white persons suspected of crimes against
blacks or other minorities. 1 52  Under the equal protection concept,
147 The apparent inconsistency here disappears if the purpose of the
constitutional position under the circumstances is considered. That is, if the
effect of considering race in a given situation is to discriminate, it is unlaw-
ful. If, however, failing to consider race results in the perpetuation of dis-
crimination, that is unlawful.
148 "[Awareness of race] must never, simply never, be applied to secure
proportional representation. It must never, simply never, be applied to secure
a predetermined or fixed limitation." 366 F.2d at 24. A rule that blacks (or
any other minority) may be deliberately included, but not in deliberate num-
bers, seems unworkable. Note, Constitutional Law-Jury Selection-Pur-
poseful Inclusion of Negroes is Constitutional, 13 WAY= L. REV. 403, 409
(1967).
149 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (1947) (dissenting opinion). For
more complete quotation, see text accompanying note 117 supra.
150 It should be noted that what is here proposed is not that each jury
proportionately reflect the community, but rather that each jury list, from
which prospective jurors are chosen at random, have proportional represen-
tation from each sub-community-socio-economic as well as racial.
151 One exception is L. MLLER, TaE PErroNERs: TiM STORY OF TnE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAES AM THE NEGRO 120-22, 292-93 (1967).
152 A former Ku Klux Klan leader, Samuel H. Bowers, accused of
plotting to murder a black leader in Mississippi, reportedly told an ex-cohort
shortly after the incident, "Don't worry .... No jury in Mississippi would
convict somebody over killing a nigger." In two trials of Bowers, the jury
was deadlocked each time. (The second jury consisted of 10 whites and 2
blacks.) San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 26, 1969, § A, at 26, cols. 2-5.
A white San Francisco police officer was recently tried for having shot
and killed a black man while off-duty. People v. O'Brien, No. CR 73512
(Super. Ct., San Francisco County, Cal., Mar. 20, 1969) (acquitted). The
evidence as reported in the newspapers, although contradictory, would clearly
have justified the prosecutor in asking for an indictment for first-or at least
second-degree murder. The indictment was for manslaughter. San Francisco
Chronicle, Nov. 2, 1968, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
It is not suggested that all white persons suspected of committing
crimes against blacks have in fact committed them. But to the extent the
correct result is reached in such cases, there would be more confidence in its
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judicial review of jury selection is limited to those situations in which
a party to the action chooses to challenge it. Where the discrimina-
tion in jury selection operates in favor of the defendant, he obviously
has no reason to challenge it. If the white defendant is convicted
by a white jury, he has no standing to challenge the exclusion of
blacks from the jury where the "same class" rule has been applied.
Even in the absence of the rule, there are strong social pressures
against his challenging the system.153  If, however, the state has an
affirmative duty to include representation from all groups, once the
due process standards are established they would prevail whether
the defendant was white or black. Justice would then better serve
the interests of a black victim (and a lawful society), as well as a
black defendant.
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
The cross section requirement, already the law for at least the
federal courts, has recently been given congressional sanction by
the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.154 The Act states:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal Courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court convenes.' 55
The Act further provides that "all citizens shall have the oppor-
tunity to be considered for service . . . and shall have an obligation
to serve . . . when summoned"' 56 and forbids exclusion on grounds
of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.' 5 7
This declaration of policy is followed in the Act by a number of
implementation provisions.
For the first time, a relatively uniform method of selecting
juries is imposed throughout the federal court system. The Act re-
quires that jurors be selected from lists of registered or actual voters,
unless additional sources of names are "necessary to foster the policy
and protect the rights" secured by the Act, 5  that is, where the
voting lists' 59 do not represent a fair cross section of the com-
correctness if the juries were not limited to whites and a few token "Uncle
Toms."
3-5 See L. MILLER, THE PsTITIONERS: TnE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE NEGRO 120-21 (1967).
154 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1964).
155 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1964).
156 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1964).
157 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1682 (1964).
158 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (2) (1964). See also
Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353, 360-61 (1967). The reason
for including actual voting lists was that registration lists are not required
by all states or are out of date. Id. at 360.
159 Voter lists were chosen because they were thought to be "probably
the most broadly based lists available." Report of the Commission on the
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munity. This eliminates the "key man" system and its variations as
the primary source of jurors. The Act also circumscribes the jury
commissioner's discretion, by making selection criteria as objective as
possible and by giving the commissioners no power to deviate from
these criteria.1 0 The enforcement provisions of the Act permit
challenges to the composition of the panel by a criminal defendant,
either party to a civil action, or the United States Attorney General
before the voir dire stage of trial by motions to dismiss the indict-
ment or to stay proceedings.161
While the 1968 Act should be somewhat successful in reducing
discriminatory jury selection in federal courts, it falls short of being
fully effective. By failing to define "fair cross section of the com-
munity," it leaves this definition to the courts. This is unfortunate
because the current judicial definition is vague, but clearly something
less than proportional representation. 162 The Act also condones
the use of voting lists as the source of jury panels, at least where
there are few overt restrictions on the right to register and vote.
The Act thus ignores the de facto discrimination inherent in such
lists.163 It seems likely that courts in the North and West will
continue to sustain the exclusive use of voter registration lists as
"beyond reproach" under the new Act, 64 at least until a right to
proportional representation is accepted. And although the Act re-
stricts the jury commissioners' discretion, it still gives courts wide
latitude to excuse or exclude. 65 Perhaps the most severe short-
coming of the Act is its failure to impose federal controls on the jury
selection methods of the states.166 In short, while the 1968 Act
Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 42 F.R.D. 353, 361 (1967).
160 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1964). The qualifi-
cations set forth by the Act are that the prospective juror: (1) be a United
States citizen, at least 21 years old, and a resident of the judicial district for
at least 1 year; (2) be able to read, write and understand English to the
degree necessary to fill out the qualification form; (3) be able to speak Eng-
lish; (4) not be incapacitated by reason of mental or physical infirmity; and
(5) not be a convicted felon or have charges pending. See also The Congress,
The Court and Jury Selection, supra note 13, at 1139.
161 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1964).
162 See text accompanying notes 125-49 supra.
163 See discussion accompanying notes 38-54 supra. That this discrimi-
nation was intentional may be inferred from a report of the Judicial Confer-
ence, where the "built-in screening element" of the lists is mentioned as a vir-
tue because of the subsequent restrictions on grounds for disqualifying jurors.
Report of the Commission on The Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353, 362 (1967).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 474 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). The court takes note of the new Act. Id. at 475 passim; accord, People
v. Tripp, No. CR 14790 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, Cal., Nov. 1, 1968).
165 See 82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1964).
166 Congress has the power to pass legislation ensuring nondiscrimina-
tory jury selection by the states under the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
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may correct some of the worst inadequacies of the federal jury sys-
tem, it does not ensure nondiscriminatory selection even in the fed-
eral courts, and it completely ignores the state courts.
The 1968 Act has, however, supplied momentum to the current
trend in jury selection. The systematic exclusion rule and its corol-
laries, based on equal protection, are giving way to the cross section
doctrine, the due process implications of which are emerging. To
date, though, the cross section doctrine has not been interpreted as
requiring proportional representation of community groups, even
though this appears to be its logical and necessary conclusion.
Some Suggested Remedies
The inadequacies and inequities of our present systems of jury
selection and the legal restrictions on them are painfully clear. The
systematic exclusion rule (which still applies in most states)1 67 be-
comes even more ineffective as methods of token inclusion of minor-
ity groups become more sophisticated.1, 8 The cross section rule as
presently interpreted by the federal courts is an improvement. What
is imperative, however, is the imposition of an affirmative duty on
the states to provide positive standards designed to ensure broadly
based, nondiscriminatory jury selection methods. Requiring propor-
tional representation on jury lists would probably be the most sig-
nificant step toward an equitable jury system. However, weaknesses
in jury selection systems could be at least partially rectified by
other remedies, which might be accepted more readily and which
would be desirable with or without proportional representation.
As has been noted, one of the major sources of discrimination in
the present system is the virtually unlimited discretion vested in
jury commissioners. It has been suggested that many of the stand-
ments. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (upholding constitu-
tionality of jury selection provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (sustaining Voting
Rights Act of 1965 under section 5 of fourteenth amendment).
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 in draft form did contain
provisions affecting the states. See Title II of the proposed bill which pro-
hibited discrimination in state jury selection. Report of the Commission, on
the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 42 F.R.D. 353, 381-86 (1967). However, Title II was an inadequate
model for the legislation needed. It failed to impose the cross-section re-
quirement of Title I, for example, or to contain effective means of enforce-
ment. See The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection, supra note 13, at
1084-94.
167 But see Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 991 (1967); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967) (imposing cross-section requirement on states in fifth circuit).
168 See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 991 (1967). See also Kuhn, supra note 7, at 237.
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ards they apply are constitutionally objectionable as being impermis-
sibly vague.169 Unless guidelines are reasonably clear, it may be
impossible to determine whether official action conforms to the stand-
ard and to secure effective review; official error and abuse are thus
undetectible. 170 One writer thinks that there may be a stronger
case for applying the "void for vagueness" doctrine to criteria for
jury selection than to those for voter registration or school admis-
sion. 17 As he puts it:
Misapplication of jury selection standards is less likely to be detected,
objected to, and remedied. The Negro not selected for jury duty be-
cause of bias will rarely know of it and even more rarely sue for the
privilege of spending two weeks in the jury room.... [H] is waiver
[of his right not to be excluded on racial grounds] cannot be per-
mitted to forfeit the right of litigants and the community to a jury
system free of discrimination.172
Another weakness in the present system is the absence of suffi-
cient guidelines for the determination of discrimination in a given
case. 7 3 Statistical probability theory should be used to supply the
needed guidelines, since it could be used to demonstrate mathemati-
cally the probability of a particular discrepancy resulting from
chance. 7 4  There has been only .one case in which the Supreme
Court gave any recognition to probability theory. It noted in Whitus
v. Georgia175 that where 27 percent of a jury list was black, the
mathematical probability of randomly choosing jury panels so that
only 7 out of 90 veniremen were black (the actual composition of the
panels) was 0.000006! 17 6
Another desirable application of contemporary mathematical
methods would be to ensure representative jury lists by the use of
population analysis and sampling techniques' 7 7  Such techniques
could be used both as a means of procuring proportionally represen-
tative lists, 1'7 8 and as a check on the representativeness of present
lists. To illustrate, the need to supplement voting lists in order to
169 E.g., Kuhn, supra note 7. at 276-82; The Congress, the Court- and
Jury Selection, supra note 13, at 1140-51; cf. People v. Tripp, No. CR 14790
(Super. Ct., San Diego County, Cal., Nov. 1, 1968).
170 Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
171 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 281.
172 Id. at 281-82.
173 Id. at 254.
174 A detailed discussion is outside the scope of this paper. See gener-
ally Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HAnv. L. REV. 338 (1966).
175 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
176 Id. at 552 n.2.
177 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 263. For a more thorough discussion, see
Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District
Court, 22 Mn. L. REV. 214 (1962).
178 Procuring lists through the use of these techniques would be more
economical than the key man system., Kuhn, supra note 7, at 263.
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have jury lists conform to a cross section of the community, as pro-
vided for in the 1968 Jury Selection Act,179 could be determined
by comparing the lists with a statistical sampling of the community.
Any undue shortcomings in the former could then be remedied by
selecting supplemental sources of jurors on the basis of the gaps
indicated by the comparison.
An essential reform of the jury system is the elimination of finan-
cial hardship as an excuse from jury service, as it results in the
disproportionate exclusion of poor people.' 80  It is inconsistent
with the requirement that a jury be representative of a cross section
of the community to say, as some courts have said, that there is
"no objection to excusing prospective veniremen for [economic] hard-
ship."'"" The economic burden of administering justice in ac-
cordance with constitutional standards must be underwritten by
the government. 182 The payment of higher fees to those perform-
ing jury service is only a partial solution.18 To the person who
would lose his job if he were absent for several weeks, the temporary
receipt of jury fees will not prevent economic hardship. 8 4  It is
thus also necessary that employers be required by law to keep the
juror's job open for him.185 If the law further required the em-
ployer to continue to pay wages to the absent juror,18 adequate
fees (probably at lower total government expense than at present)
could then be paid to those who do not have regular jobs, such as
workers who are employed on a daily basis, and housewives. 187
Discriminatory jury selection results in loss of confidence in and
respect for the administration of justice.188 This is clearly true for
179 28 U.S.C. §_ 1863(b)(2) (1964).
180 See text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
181 United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
182 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1955).
183 The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 doubled the basic jury
fee from ten dollars per diem to twenty dollars per diem in federal courts.
82 Stat. 53 (1968), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1964).
184 Job protection is undoubtedly a major reason for the unduly small
proportion of younger people on juries.
185 Cf. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (state
statute requiring that employees be given paid time off to vote held not to
violate 14th amendment or contract clause of article I, section 10). But cf.
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955).
186 Cf. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
187 But cf. Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128
N.E.2d 691 (1955).
187 Although the states could adopt legislation to meet these needs,
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), it seems highly
unlikely that many of them will do so; federal legislation is probably a more
effective and slightly more likely possibility. Congress would have power to
pass such legislation under section 5 of the 14th amendment. See discussion
note 166 supra.
188 See Kuhn, supra note 7, at 245-47.
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members of minority groups who may confront a jury as criminal
defendants or parties to a civil action. Exclusion of minority groups
also deprives them as individuals from one of the very few oppor-
tunities available to them to directly participate in the processes of
government. 189 As was said in a recent decision:
The realities of our society emphasize the importance of jury
panels drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.
... Litigants and witnesses come into Court from all walks of life in
a highly varied community. Unless jury panels represent the same
walks of life and the same pattern of cultural differences, they will be
less likely to understand fully the implications of the testimony they
hear and the situations they must evaluate, and less likely to bring
into their deliberations the background of experience and wisdom re-
quired for a just result. Similarly, the narrower the cultural spec-
trum of our jury panels, the less confidence the under-represented
groups will have in the courts as temples of justice.190
Discriminatory selection also causes a breakdown in morality and
increased lawlessness in the dominant culture.' 91 When juries are
not representative, "[t]he injury is not limited to the defendant-
there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the
processes of the courts."'' 92 We thus have a vital interest in seeking
radical improvement in our present methods of jury selection.
Jennie Rhine*
189 Id.; Broeder, supra note 8, at 25-26. Broeder conducted a study of 23
jury trials, during which he interviewed, among others, the 3 black jurors on
the juries. He writes that: "The account of the reactions of these [three
black] jurors to their service is, for the most part, a dismal one. The chief
bright spot consists in the immense gratification they derived simply from
being selected to participate . .. ."
"... [J]ury service democratizes, serving as a constant reminder that
each of us has a say in the affairs of government." Id.
190 People v. Craig, No. 41750, at 7 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal.,
April 18, 1968).
191 Kuhn, supra note 7, at 245-47. See also note 152 and accompany-
ing text supra.
192 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
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